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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE FAIR TRADE ACTS
PICHARD K. BATESt
I.
Fair Trade, the persistent child of protective legislation and the subject of only faint judicial remonstrances for two decades, has, in a few
short years, discovered itself in troubled adulthood. Its once tranquil
existence has been transformed into one of stormy attack.
As is well known, so-called "Fair Trade" laws authorize contracts
for sale or resale of a given commodity under which the purchaser agrees
that he will not resell except at the exact or minimum price stipulated by
the vendor. They apply only to commodities identified by trade-mark,
trade-name or brand and in fair and open competition with commodities
of the same general class. The heart of every such act is the famous
"nonsigner" provision which creates a cause of action for unfair competition against anyone who, willfully and knowingly, sells the commodity
at a price below that established by a written contract, whether or not
the seller is a party thereto.
At common law, there appears to have been no violation in the nature of restraint of trade if a manufacturer desired to exact from a reseller of his product a written promise to sell only at the price stipulated.'
A manufacturer's covenant fixing retail prices as incidental to some main
contract was sustained provided it involved less than a controlling part
of a given commodity in a given market, did not tend to create a
monopoly, was reasonable in reference to the interests of the parties and
of the public, and the price fixed was necessary to the protection of the
covenantee and fair to the public in that it furnished only a reasonable
profit to the parties.2
t Graduate, University of Illinois College of Law. The author expresses his gratitude for the advice and assistance given by Professor Kenneth S. Carlston, University
of Illinois College of Law, during the writing of this article.

1. Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N.E. 174 (1900).
2. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913);

accord, Grogan v. Chafee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909) ; Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 111 Ky. 203, 63 S.W. 427 (1901) ; Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29

P.2d 374 (1934).
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However, the impact of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, announced in
the famous Dr. Miles case,' left little doubt with regard to the validity of
vertical resale price agreements. The United States Supreme Court,
with only Justice Holmes dissenting, held that such an agreement between a manufacturer of patent medicines and his retailers actually restrained competition on the latter level as effectively as any horizontal
price-fixing agreement. Thus, vertical price fixing was condemned as
expressly offensive to antitrust policy.
The birth of Fair Trade, the legislative sanction to vertical price
setting, came in the early years of the depression of the nineteen thirties.
The first Fair Trade Act was passed by California in 1931,' and has
served as a model for all others with few variations. By 1941, all but
three states had enacted similar acts. 5
The constitutionality of these state statutes was sustained in 1936
over objections grounded upon the fifth amendment and the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.Seagram-DistillersCorp.6 One year later Congress passed the Miller-Tydings amendment,7 and thus effected a statutory exemption from the Sherman Act for all state Fair Trade laws.
The nearly unanimous adoption of price-fixing laws should not be
misleading. Misgivings and outright condemnations were published and
3. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 16900-05 (Deering 1951). The pertinent sections are quoted below in part: "16902. No contract relating to the sale or resale of a
commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trade-mark, brand,
or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is in fair and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others violates any
law of this State by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained
in such contract: (1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at the price
stipulated by the vendor. (2) That the vendee or producer require the person to whom
he may resell such commodity to agree that he will not, in turn, resell except at the
price stipulated by such vendor.
"16904. Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to this
chapter, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a
party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby."
5. The only states which have never enacted Fair Trade legislation are Missouri,
Texas and Vermont. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3075.
6. Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2
N.E.2d 940 (1936), aff'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
The Supreme Court there said the Illinois Fair Trade Act was designed solely "to afford a legitimate remedy for an injury
to the good will which results from the use of trade-marks, brands or names." It held
the act effective against signatories and informed dealers alike as a valid exercise of
the state's police power for the purpose of safeguarding a supplier's proprietary interests
from impairment through price cutting and "loss-leader" selling. The court in effect
held that there was no federal constitutional question involved in these state Fair Trade
statutes, but rather that their constitutionality was a matter for determination by the
state through its legislature and its courts. Id. at 196.
7. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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heard even before the California act became effective.8 The lines were
drawn in Professor Shulman's excellent and concise analysis of the issues
in 1940.' Despite the vigorous and continued criticism of Fair Trade,
the momentum of the movement has caused the acts to become deeply
imbedded in the state statutes. And, as in most instances of state legislation, once imbedded, it becomes almost impervious to change. The
consumer, purportedly the center of the controversy with regard to his
"protection," but most often neglected, could not conceivably organize
and maintain lobby and pressure groups so well as retail merchants and
other sellers who are solid entities. A depression of the market for goods,
followed on its heels by a period of wartime scarcities and shortages,
kept the picture of Fair Trade out of focus. The retailers' organized
pressure combined with the depression and war was enough to keep the
balance among the relevant group interests far in favor of Fair Trade.
This balance has apparently been shaken. The era of continued
economic expansion, and the corresponding increase in the manufacturing of all types of consumer goods, has wiped out any possible justifications for Fair Trade based upon depression-wartime arguments, i.e.,
creation of monopoly due to either shortage of buying power or scarcity
of commodities. The first evidence of this new situation was madeapparent in the case of Schwegmnum Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,10 in
which the Supreme Court overturned effective Fair Trade by announcing that since the Miller-Tydings amendment exempted only "contracts
or agreements" from its anti-monopoly provisions and did not include a
sanction of Louisiana's nonsigner provision, it would incorrectly "perform a distinct legislative function by reading into the [Federal] Act a
SELIGMAN & LovE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 99 (1932).
9. Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940). "The change of policy with reference to resale
price maintenance," said Professor Shulman, "was not due to the pressure of analogies
from the law of real property or to the discovery or better understanding of any doctrine
of equitable servitudes or of any general principles of equity jurisprudence, fundamental
or otherwise. It was rather the response to a cry of distress from groups of people
who have found their voices and who have learned, particularly during the days of the
Nr\A, how to use them in unison and effectively." Id. at 623.
It is undeniably true today, if not in 1940, that "the Fair Trade Acts are concerned
not with the protection of the producer or the owner of the trade-mark, but with the
protection of certain types of wholesale and retail distributors. Their function and object is not to protect the good-will symbolized by the trade-mark, but to alleviate the
rigors of price competition between distributors ....
[T]he concern of the Acts with
trademarked goods is accidental and incidental. .
"It is common knowledge that the pressure for the passage of these Acts, insofar as
it was publicly disclosed, came not from manufacturers or other trade-mark owners but
from distributors-first and foremost the retail druggists associations and then other
retail and wholesale distributors." Id. at 615.
10. 341 U.S. 384 (1951), referred to as the "first Schwegmann decision."
8.
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provision that was meticulously omitted from it."" At the same time,
an inroad upon Fair Trade was accomplished in the lower federal courts
when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a manufacturer of
electric shavers was not entitled to enforce the Pennsylvania Fair Trade
law against a Pennsylvania mail-order business in its shipments to points
outside Pennsylvania. 2
Immediately after the Schwegmann decision, a wave of price-cutting
and loss-leader selling was followed within a year by an apparent loss of
interest in price-cutting on fair-traded commodities. In spite of the
relatively small area of these price wars, and the obvious fact that even
in those places normality was returning, Congress, after bitter debate,
enacted the highly controversial McGuire Act." As is obvious, Fair
Trade laws without nonsigner provisions to govern interstate sales are
worthless. The effect of the McGuire Act was to clearly negate the first
Schlwegmann decision. However, the loss of prestige which Fair Trade
suffered as a result of that decision was never fully regained. Instead,
large discount houses and chain groceries have come forward as individual champions of the fight against price-fixing laws. Increased production in consumer goods during and following the Korean War foretold
a precarious future for state Fair Trade laws. An expanding economy
in its wealthiets period strains at every restraint upon a free market,
whether the particular restraint be considered good or bad. Some manufacturers have entirely dropped Fair Trade practices, due to increased
costs of enforcement and pressure of mounting sales, and others are fast
losing interest.' 4 As a result, some states have developed equitable limitations upon Fair Trade, denying injunctive relief to a trade-mark owner
who has not vigorously enforced his rights in the area prior to his instant
action. 5 Although the Supreme Court refused to rule upon the constitutionality of the McGuire Act by denying certiorari to a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision,' 6 serious questions concerning these statutes
and their validity under state constitutions and state public policy have
begun to be raised in the state courts. The latter, once generally content to rest upon the Old Dearborn case as the last word on the validity
of Fair Trade and its nonsigner provision, have begun to examine its
reasons for existence and the validity of those reasons. It should also be
11. Id. at 388.
12. Sunbeam v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), vacated, 341 U.S. 944
(1951), opinion on remand, 192 F.2d 7 (1951).
13. 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
14. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 7, 1956, p. 1, col. 2.
15. Comment, 10 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 1 (1954).
16. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 205 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953), herein referred to as the "second Schwegmann decision."
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noted that since the Supreme Court has often held that a denial of certiorari implies neither approval nor disapproval,1 7 the Court is in no manner bound by its second Schwegr'wnrn decision.
The oldest contention advanced by the exponents of Fair Trade laws
is that the latter rightfully protect the trade-mark and good will of a
manufacturer's commodity. It is asserted that when a manufacturer
produces a quality product, protects it with a trade-mark or brand name,
and by nation-wide advertising brings it to public attention, for the ultimate benefit of his retailers as well as himself, the resulting good will
should not be allowed to become the means for attracting buyers to the
purchase of inferior products, i.e., to be used as a loss-leader.
A second contention favoring Fair Trade is advanced by owners of
"small stable retail businesses." Led by the influential National Association of Retail Druggists, it is submitted by this group that small businesses cannot, lacking large-volume sales ability, compete with prices set
by large competitors for loss-leader purposes. The result of allowing
these low-margin, high-volume sellers to run stable, quality items at
prices below cost for customer attraction purposes in effect allows them
the power to establish a monopoly over the resale of that product. This,
it is said, is just as much unfair competition as allowing direct monopoly
control of a commodity. What these proponents of Fair Trade would
seem to argue, therefore, is that the commodity, to be fair-traded, must
be in open competition with other commodities of the same general class,
and that competition is not eliminated by Fair Trade laws, which only
eliminate "unbridled" competition occasioned by the use of loss-leaders.
Fair Trade laws have long been most vigorously opposed by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.18 It has been
the position of the two federal government agencies most concerned with
the enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that the state Fair
Trade laws, and the federal permissive acts relating thereto, are in absolute derogation of the seventy-year-old antitrust policies of the federal
government. In both theory and principle, the FTC contends, any law
which allows a private person to fix prices upon goods in the competitive
free market without any governmental review is in direct contravention
of the free enterprise system of government. Less organized but not
less vociferous opposition has come from labor, commerce, and consumer organizations who advance the thesis that Fair Trade laws harm
the cofisumer by keeping retail margins artificially and excessively high.
17. Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950) ; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1949) ; United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (1923).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1292, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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It is contended that rather than to protect the small retailer from damage
from negligible instances of loss-leader selling on the part of high-volume
sellers, the main purpose of the Fair Trade laws is to guarantee a profit
insured by a lack of real and actual competition. The fact is continually
pointed up by these Fair Trade opponents that the real advocates of pricefixing laws are the retail merchants associations who want a profit
guaranteed and who are unwilling to face competition, and not the manufacturers, protection of whose trade-marks, trade-names and brands is
said to be the purpose behind Fair Trade statutes. 9
Statistics and surveys on both sides have proved fairly inconclusive
by their extreme variance. While one survey has shown prices on specific fair-traded commodities in Maryland to be consistently higher than
on those same commodities in the non-Fair Trade District of Columbia,2"
another has resulted in a finding that in non-Fair Trade states the average prices paid for otherwise fair-traded products were generally no
more or no less than in states which regularly enforced injunctive Fair
Trade provisions.2
While the majority of the highest state courts have found their Fair
Trade laws compatible with their states' constitutional guarantees, a
growing minority of state courts, mostly in recent decisions, have, for
divergent reasons, held identical Fair Trade laws unconstitutional under
state constitutions. It appears to be generally felt that the Supreme
Court will not, having indirectly but yet effectively sustained the McGuire Act, overturn its attitude toward the constitutionality of this permissive federal legislation in the near future. It appears more certain
that the Court is content with its guide-line drawn in the Old Dearborn
case, i.e., that although no federal question of constitutionality exists as
to state Fair Trade acts, there nevertheless may be valid grounds for
their being held unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds. In
an area such as this, where policy is so closely connected with politics, it
is notably the disposition of the Supreme Court often to leave the matter
to the individual state courts unless it appears quite out of hand. The
extreme variance of statistics on the question indicates in one way the
almost certain impossibility of presenting to the Court an "ungovernable
situation" necessary to obtain a reconsideration of its position.
19. For an excellent presentation of the opposing arguments regarding Fair Trade
laws, including an analysis of the Commerce Committee Hearings on Minimum Resale
Prices, conducted prior to the passage of the McGuire Act, see Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21 CHICAGo L. REv. 175, 186 (1954).

20. Id. at 195.
21. Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64
(1955).

YAL

L.J. 967, 973
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It is also to be noted that no serious or concerted efforts by organized groups opposing Fair Trade have been made toward repeal of the
state or federal acts since the passage of the McGuire Act. Thus, an
unusual situation has now developed where the state courts are taking
the initiative away from the federal courts, Congress, and the state legislatures by examining and even re-examining the real purposes, practices,
and effects of Fair Trade laws. With this situation becoming increasingly apparent, the focal point for Fair Trade opponents is the state
courts, whose decisions upon grounds other than federal law will, it is
believed, decide the future of Fair Trade. It will therefore be the purpose of this study to examine those state court decisions with particular
reference to the various grounds upon which they have invalidated Fair
Trade laws and vertical private price controls.
The highest state courts in fifteen states have, since the passage of
the first Fair Trade laws, upheld the constitutionality of the nonsigner
provisions contained therein.22 Lower court decisions in Ohio and New
Mexico upholding the nonsigner clauses of those acts,23 and a 1939 Attorney General's opinion describing a fifty-dollar penalty provision in
the Massachusetts Fair Trade Act as constitutional and enforceable
against both signers and nonsigners 4 raise the total of states judicially
committed to enforcement of their Fair Trade laws to eighteen. In
22. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936); Scovill
Manufacturing Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 291 P.2d 936 (Cal. 1955); Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A.2d 841
(1942) ; Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., 127 F.Supp. 739 (D.C.
Conn. 1954); Klein v. National Pressure Cooker Co., 31 Del. Ch. 459, 64 A.2d 529
(1949) ; Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E2d
940 (1936); Barron Motors, Inc. v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 227 Iowa 1344, 291 N.W.
152 (1940); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939);
Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Remington-Putnam Book Co., 186 Md. 210, 46 A.2d 101 (1946);
W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 So.2d 838 (1950) ; General Electric
Co. v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., Inc., 14 N.J. 209, 102 A.2d 18 (1953); Lionel Corp.
v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304 (1954); Bourjois Sales
Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1937) ; General Electric Co. v. Masters,
Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1953) ; Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939) ;
Burch Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955) ; Miles Laboratories,
Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940); Frankfort Distillers Corp.
v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478, 230 S.W.2d 971 (1950) ; Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Goronswet,
281 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1955); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10
Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1940); Elgin National Watch Co. v. Drukman, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1953 Trade Cas.)
67,498 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1953) ; Weco Products
Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937); Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson, 270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955).
23. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., CC- TRADE REG. REP.
(1955 Trade Cas.) 1 68,165 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1955) ; Skaggs Drug Center
v. General Electric Co., 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 168,471 (N.M. Dist.
Ct., Sept., 1956).
24. 1 CCH TRADE kEG. REP. (10th ed.) 1 3085.23.
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thirteen states,2" Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, no decisions regarding the
validity of Fair Trade laws have been reported.2" Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia have never enacted Fair Trade legislation. Ten state supreme courts have found, for reasons later to be
fully presented, that their respective Fair Trade acts are unconstitutional,
at least as regards nonsigners. In five states, lower courts have rendered
decisions denying constitutionality to such nonsigner provisions. It
should be noted especially that, although the first of these state decisions
was rendered as long ago as 1939, six of these decisions were handed
down in 1956, and three in 1955. A comparison of the more recent
dates of these decisions denying constitutionality as compared to the
generally early dates of those decisions upholding their respective statutes
indicates both the misleading quality of the "weight of authority" and
the obvious trend in the state courts today. The conclusion is inescapable that the future of Fair Trade laws in the United States is at stake.
II.
At the present time there seem no longer to be any federal constitutional or statutory barriers to Fair Trade legislation. However, the
state Fair Trade acts have continued to suffer vicissitudes in the state
courts, and in none have they fared worse than in Florida. On two
occasions the Florida Supreme Court managed to invalidate the act on
technical grounds without actually declaring the substance of the act
unconstitutional.
The real issue was decided in 1949, however, in the leading case of
Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp.2" A 1939 amendment
25. Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Wyoming.
26. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 1 3003.
27. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91
(1939), the non-signer provision of the first Florida Fair Trade Act (Fla. Laws 1937,
c. 18395, § 6) was held unconstitutional as not within the scope of the act's title. The
supreme court concurred in the lower court holding that the inclusion in the title of the
expression "through the use of voluntary contracts" restricts the subject of the act
and implies that its provisions will apply only to retailers who voluntarily enter into
such contracts. Enforcement of the statutory injunction against defendant for price
cutting was denied because he was not a party to any contract with the plaintiff. The
nonsigner provision of the statute was thus rendered ineffective. In Scarborough v.
Webb's Cut-Rate Drug Co., 150 Fla. 754, 8 So.2d 913 (1942), the director of the State
Beverage Department was restrained from enforcing a penalty provision of the Florida
Beverage Act (Fla. Laws 1941, c. 21001) against a price-cutting, nonsigner retailer.
The court said: "The only power in any State Agency is that conferred upon the
Beverage Department to see that those prices fixed by the distributors are enforced.
This provision alone is enough to condemn the Act as being unconstitutional and void."
Id. at 775.
28. 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
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to the act2 had cured the technical defects, leaving nothing but the constitutional issue squarely before the court. It was then decisively held
that the Florida Fair Trade Act exceeded the bounds of the legislature's
police power because it served the private interest of one economic group
to the detriment of the general public by allowing an interested person the
power to fix a price without any review of his act. As a price-fixing
statute, the Florida court found it arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative
of the constitutional right to own and enjoy property. It established its
present-day position in regard to the Old Dearborncase in holding: "The
court of last resort of each sovereign state is the final arbiter as to
whether the act conforms to its own constitution whereas the federal
courts are concerned only with whether the act offends the Federal Constitution."3 The court did not limit its decision to the nonsigner provision, but held the entire act unconstitutional.
Immediately following the Liquor Store decision, the persistent
Florida legislature passed a third Fair Trade Act,3 in all respects similar
to the act of 1939 except that a lengthy preamble entitled "Findings of
Fact" was annexed, which in effect declared that the statute would serve
the public interest and was a lawful exercise of the police power. 2 A
new provision, presumably inserted to calm critics of the monopolistic
tendencies of the act, empowered the attorney general to "bring an action . . . to restrain the performance or enforcement of" any contract

which he deemed to prevent competition.33 This was not enough. The
nonsigner clause in this act was held in valid in Seagram-DistillersCorp.
v. Ben Green, Inc.,34 solely on the authority of the first Schwegmann
case, and without the court finding it necessary to rule on the effectiveness of the legislature's amendments. With the passage of the federal
McGuire Act, which cured the defects of the Miller-Tydings Act and
overthrew the legal effect of the first Schwegrnann decision, Florida law
again became somewhat unsettled, although the position of its supreme
court could, by this time, hardly have been more obvious.
Generously, the court agreed to settle the doubt, and in 1955 the
invalidity of Fair Trade in Florida was presumably settled. In Miles
Laboratories, Inc. v. Eckerd,35 the question whether the McGuire Act
had caused its decision in the Seagram-Distillerscase to be superseded
was placed squarely before the court. The effect of the McGuire Act
29. FLA. LAWS 1939, c. 19201.
30. 40 So.2d at 375.

31. FLA. LAWS 1949, c. 25204.
32. FLA. LAws 1949, c. 25204, § 1.
33. FLA. LAWS 1949, c. 25204, § 10.
34. 54 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1951).
35. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1955).
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was disposed of by holding that "the decisions of this court interpreting
the Constitution of Florida are supreme and will not be overthrown by
act of Congress or the Federal Courts unless some Federal constitutional
question is involved." 6 The court, in sounding the death knell in Florida
for Fair Trade, said: "This Court has expressed its views on fair trade
and similar acts and has consistently and unequivocally rejected, on constitutional grounds, both the underlying theory and the economic facts on
which they are sought to be predicated . . . [A]s we have stated before,

the real effect of the nonsigner clause is anti-competitive price-fixing,
not the protecting of the good will of the trade-marked products as other
courts have held . . . [T] he nonsigner clause must fall as an invalid use

of the police power for a private, not a public purpose."3 7
An indication of the finality of the Miles Laboratoriesdecision is to
be noted in the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, Inc.8 In that case, a manufacturer of fair-traded electrical appliances brought a bill for injunction and
damages on the ground that defendant had interfered with Fair Trade
contracts between that manufacturer and distributors and retailers of its
products by inducing them to sell such products to defendant in violation
of those contracts. The district court dismissed and the court of appeals
affirmed on the ground that the complaint failed to allege a cause of
action. 9
Assuming that the federal court's position on the Florida law is correct, the refusal to allow an action for inducement to breach a Fair Trade
contract leaves the fair-trader only his "inter partes" action, regarding
which there is even some doubt as to future enforceability. But as to the
nonsigner of a Fair Trade contract, the law in Florida is clear that he is
under no responsibility to maintain a manufacturer's minimum resale
price. In sum, the nonsigner provision of the Florida law is void and
36. Id. at 681. The court cited Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907),
and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
37. Id. at 681-82.
38. 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
39. The contention was made before the federal court that the Florida Supreme
Court had retreated from its position in the Miles Laboratoriescase by denying certiorari
to a lower court decision holding a Fair Trade resale-price maintenance contract
enforceable as between the parties thereto. Chase & Sherman v. Sunbeam Corp.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 67,524 (Cir. Ct., Dade County 1954), cert.
denied without opinion, 73 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1954). The federal court said: "Since we
conclude that, whether or not Fair Trade contracts are enforceable between the parties
thereto, the public policy established by the Florida Supreme Court is opposed to actions
such as the present one, there is no conceivable way in which plaintiff could prove a right
to recover on the allegations of this complaint. . . . It is settled law that no foreign
tort action contrary to a strong public policy of the forum state can be maintained."
225 F.2d 191, 198.
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unconstitutional in that it (1) violates public policy, (2) bears no relation to the public health, morals, peace, safety, or general welfare, and,
as such, is an abuse of the police power, and (3) it attempts to delegate
the sovereign power of the state for a private purpose.
The second nonsigner provision of a state act to fall was that of the
Minnesota Fair Trade Act4" in the case of Calvert Distillers Corp. v.
Sachs."' However, the scope of the Minnesota decision was limited. The
court decided the issue of the validity of the nonsigner provision solely
on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in the first
Schwegmann case, and prior to the enactment of the McGuire Act. The
court gave no indication if its view as to the validity or invalidity of the
act under the state's own constitution, laws, or public policy, and no
cases have arisen in Minnesota since that decision which would test the
court's position regarding the effect of the McGuire Act. The Minnesota Attorney General has stated in an opinion that the McGuire Act
does change the rule of the first Schwegmxann case, and that the nonsigner provision of the Minnesota act is now effective."
The lack of any direct authority renders it impossible to draw a
satisfactory conclusion. Whether the Minnesota Supreme Court will,
at the next opportunity, hold that the McGuire Act did settle the controversy, or whether it will re-examine the statute on state grounds, remains to be seen.
In 1952, prior to the passage of the McGuire Act, Michigan became
the third state whose supreme court was to rule against the constitutionality of Fair Trade. However, unlike the Minnesota court, the Michigan court based its decision almost solely upon the ground that the act
was violative of state constitutional guarantees. In Shakespeare Co. v.
Lippman Tool Shop Sporting Goods, 3 it was held that the Michigan
Fair Trade Act44 was unconstitutional as applied to persons who had not
signed an agreement to maintain Fair Trade prices, since it deprived such
persons of property without due process of law within the meaning of
the Michigan constitution.4 5 Since plaintiff was a Michigan corporation
and defendant a sporting-goods retailer doing business only in Michigan,
the trial court elected to treat the transaction involved as being exclusively in intrastate as distinguished from interstate commerce. It then
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.12 (1947).
41. 234 Minn. 303, 48 N.W.2d 531 (1951).
42. CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1952 Trade Cas.)
40.

General of Minnesota, December 10, 1952).

43. 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).
44. MicH. ComP. LAws § 445.151 (1948).
45. Micr. CONST. art. 2, § 16 (1908).
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proceeded to dismiss the bill for injunction on the sole ground that the
act, as applied to a non-contracting person, was violative of the due
process clause of the state constitution. In affirming the dismissal, the
supreme court held that the better reasoned view was that of the Florida
court in Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., and that such
was the only view consistent with its holding in People v. Victor.4" An
attempt by plaintiff to distinguish the Shakespeare case on the ground
that the Fair Trade Act involved protection of a person's property, i.e.,
good will represented by a trade-mark, was turned away by the majority
of the court, which reasoned that trade-marks are protected in certain
respects by Congress, notably in the elimination of duplication and confusion between products, but were entitled to no further protection under
state laws. The court rejected the theory that the statute prevented
"destructive price-cutting" and "the evils of a price war," which in turn
vitally affect the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, by
merely stating in effect that such a concept is not that upon which
America's free competitive economy was developed.
As an addendum, the Michigan court found the act, as applied to
nonsigners, within the prohibition of the Sherman Act, basing its conclusion upon the first Schwegmann decision. Thus, both the intrastate and
interstate price maintenance activities of Michigan manufacturers were
rendered ineffective as to nonsigners in the Shakespeare decision.
Three years later, in Argus Cameras, Inc. v. Hall of Distributors,
Inc., the Michigan Supreme Court rendered the state's Fair Trade Act
almost totally ineffective by denying a temporary injunction to restrain
a nonsigner defendant from tortiously interfering with plaintiff's written contracts with wholesalers and retailers. The court affirmed its position in the Shakespeare case, and further added that the public policy
of Michigan was stated therein to be against enforcement of Fair Trade
laws as applied to nonsigners. The significance of the decision for
present purposes is that the court found justification for the defendant's
acts in section 774 of the Restatement of Torts,4" which provides that a
defendant is privileged to induce the non-performance of a contract "the
purpose or effect of which is to restrict his business opportunities in violation of a defined public policy," and is so privileged even though such
46. 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939).

In the case it was held that a statute

forbidding the giving of a premium with the retail sale of gasoline was unconstitutional
as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law, for the reason
that such legislation is outside the scope of the police power inasmuch as it bears no
reasonable relationship to the public morals, health, safety or general welfare.
47. 343 Mich. 54, 72 N.W.2d 152 (1955).
48. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 766 (1939).
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Although the decision
a contract may be enforceable inter partes"
creates a somewhat anomalous situation in Michigan law,5" it is nevertheless quite clear that it virtually nullifies Fair Trade in Michigan.
It is to be noted that the Michigan Supreme Court based its decision entirely on the proposition that the Fair Trade Act violates the due
process clause of the state constitution, with support from admittedly
rather questionable precedent. Significantly, it barely touched on the
background and economic history of Fair Trade. Though its decisions
may not be so well reasoned as those of Florida and several other states,
they are just as decisive in their result.
Perhaps the most thorough consideration given to a state Fair Trade
act by any court is that of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which has
twice held such an act unconstitutional. In the first case, GraysonRobinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida,Ltd.,5 decided in 1953, the court struck
down the entire Georgia Fair Trade Act52 on the ground that, when enacted on March 4, 1937, it was contrary to the express provisions of the
federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act and therefore void ab initio. Subsequent enabling legislation in the form of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts could not operate to validate the Georgia act since it was
void from its inception. "A void statute can be made effective only by
reenactment."5 3 By referring to its reasoning in a former decision," the
court also held that the Georgia act "offends article 1, section 1, paragraph 3 of our Constitution of 1945, which provides that 'No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by the due process of
law.' . . . [A] nd for that reason the act is null and void." 5

In 1955, however, the Georgia court was met with the contention
that its second ruling in the Grayson-Robinson case was obiter dictum
for the reason that the case had already been disposed of on the grounds
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at comment a.
Note, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 711, 712 (1956).
209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953).
GA. SEss. LAws 1937, p. 800.
Jones v. McCaskill, 112 Ga. 453, 37 S.E. 724 (1900) ; State v. Miller, 66 W.Va.

436, 66 S.E. 522 (1909).

54. Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951). In this case the question
was presented as to the constitutionality of a provision in the Georgia Milk Control
Law which attempted to set the retail price of milk by authorizing such action by an
appointed board. In adopting a previous dissenting opinion, the court said "that as a
health measure reasonable regulations may be enacted by the legislature, applying to
sale and distribution of milk under the police power of the state," but by its provision
to fix the price of milk "it thus takes from the seller and purchaser the right to agree
upon the price of their choice. . . . The right to contract is a property right which is
protected by the due process clauses of our State and Federal Constitutions, which
cannot be abridged by mere legislative act." Id. at 562.
55. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 619, 75.S.E.2d 161,

164 (1953).
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that the statute was void ab initio.5 The gap was sealed and Fair Trade
was ended in Georgia by the holding that the reenacted Georgia Fair
Trade Act" "clearly violates the provisions of the due-process clause of
the Constitution of the State of Georgia.""8
This appears to be one of the strongest state court positions on the
subject of legislative or private price fixing. The court refused to consider the subtle, perpetual arguments for Fair Trade based upon protection of trade-marks and public welfare, and recognized the act to be
merely a price-fixing measure for which there was no conceivable public
need. If the milk industry is not within the scope of public interest as
regards price fixing, 9 said the court, "electrical appliances are not.""0
Although the nonsigner provision was at issue in both cases, the court in
its opinion makes no distinction between signatories and nonsigners, and
thus, presumably, has invalidated the entire act."'
Less than a year passed before the validity of another state Fair
Trade law was tested, this time before the Arkansas Supreme Court in
the well-known Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc. case. 2 In an action for an injunction against a price-cutting
defendant under the act's nonsigner provision, the trial court denied relief on the ground that the act violated sections 2, 8, 18, 19, and 29 of
article 2 of the Arkansas constitution. On appeal to the state supreme
court, the facts were fully stipulated and it was agreed that no federal
constitutional question was involved. Only the nonsigner provision6 3 of
the act was under attack, and the court stated that it would limit its
discussion to section 8, article 2 of the state constitution which provided
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law. The pivotal issue was therefore whether the act, including its
nonsigner provision, constituted an abuse of the police power of the legislature. In holding that there were "several considered matters which
impel us to conclude that the Act is not to protect the public welfare and
56. Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955).
57. GA.SEss. LAws 1953, p. 549.
58. Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 292, 85 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1955).
59. See note 54 supra.
60. Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 289, 85 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1955).
61. In its most recent opinion on the subject of legislative price-fixing, a unanimous
Georgia Court cited the three cases above as binding precedents for the rule that any
price-fixing is void in Georgia. Williams v. Hirsch, 211 Ga. 534, 87 S.E.2d 70 (1955).
62. 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1954). The case was first brought in the
Federal District Court of Arkansas, but the court refused to decide the case because
the Arkansas courts had not passed on the question of Fair Trade, which involved
a state constiutional question. Plaintiff was allowed twenty days in which to bring its
case in the Arkansas courts. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors,
Inc., 118 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-201 (1947).
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therefore violates our constitution,"0 4 the court considered the following
four points: (1) The act can be sustained only if it enhances the general
welfare and not if it restricts it. A trade-mark is entitled to protection,
which; being ample under the federal laws, entitles the plaintiff to no
additional protection by state law if it is at the expense of the general
welfare. Since competition is, to a degree, restricted by the act, the
interest of the public is not served thereby. (2) "The history of the
promulgation of Fair Trade Acts justifies the inference they were
thought to benefit a few manufacturers and not the general public."
Also, ". .. by far the most enthusiastic advocate of fair trade legislation is the retail druggist.""5 The court concerned itself with the realities of Fair Trade while developing this second point, and concluded
that the real purpose of Fair Trade laws today is to eliminate price competition between retailers. (3) A statute which fixes prices for goods
or services must have an obvious and real connection with the public
health, safety and welfare. In Noble v. Davis,0 the Arkansas court denied constitutionality to a statute fixing charges to be made by barbers
for their services. The connection of this statute to the public welfare
was called "visionary and not real" and a "nonexisting fact." This decision, said the court, controlled the present one on the point that a statement by the legislature that a statute is in the public interest will have
no effect on the court's decision if it be the fact that the statute is not a
proper matter for legislative concern. (4) The Arkansas court cited
with approval the "well-reasoned" decisions of the Florida, Michigan
and Georgia courts, with particular emphasis upon the latters' rulings on
the due process objection.
It is to be noted that the Arkansas court did not hesitate to investigate the political-economic aspects of Fair Trade legislation in reaching
its decision. It had the benefit of prior concurring decisions, but reached
an independent conclusion based upon its own due process clause. The
basic grounds for the unconstitutionality of Fair Trade in Arkansas
appear to be (1) prior Arkansas precedent against price-fixing statutes,
whether the price be set by the legislature or the power to set the price
be delegated thereby, and (2) an invalid exercise of the police power,
with the result that the act violates the due process clause of the Arkansas constitution.
In a well-considered opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court invali64. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
562, 27 S.W.2d 455, 457 (1954).
65. Id. at 563.
66. 204 Ark. 156, 161 S.W.2d 189 (1941).
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dated its entire Fair Trade Act." In McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis &
Smith Drug Co.,68 decided in early 1955, injunctive relief was denied
against a price-cutting retailer by the lower court. On appeal, eight
specifications of challenge to the act were designated," two of, which
were the basis for the supreme court's decision. (1) "The Fair Trade
Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of Article III, section 1, of the Constitution of the State of
Nebraska, to fix prices of goods without conforming to any standards
prescribed by the legislature." (2) "The Fair Trade Act has the effect
of depriving of liberty and property without due process of law, and
constitutes legislation beyond the scope of the police power and contrary
to Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. ..."
Regarding specification (1) above, the court held the question of
legislative delegation of power to be of incidental concern but not of
controlling importance. For the real question, said the court, was not
the validity of an inter partes contract, but the validity of the provision
which extended obligations between contracting persons to persons who
were not parties to such contracts.
Specification (2), however, was held to be the crux of the objection
to the act. In this respect the court said, "The conclusion is inescapable
that trade-mark owners, producers, and wholesalers may, by the simple
device of attaching to their commodities a distinguishing brand or mark
and entering into a contract with a single retailer, establish and maintain
on a horizontal level for all retailers a minimum retail price.""
The
effects of such legislation are therefore to permit one producer and one
retailer to do that which legally the members of each class are forbidden
to do, to compel retailers to observe agreements to which they have never
assented, to permit impairment and destruction of the right of the retailer
to freely sell commodities which he has bought and of which he has become owner in good faith, and to immunize sellers of a commodity
against competition. In view of such effects, the court held the nonsigner provision of the act unconstitutional as a grant of special privilege and immunity. The objection grounded upon due process was also
considered to be well taken. "Liberty," said the court, "within the constitutional meaning includes absence of arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon a person in the conduct of his business and the handling of
his property."
67. NEB. LAws 1937, c. 136, p. 478.
68. 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955).
69. Id. at 710.
70. Id. at 716.
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Since the nonsigner provision of the act was void and unconstitutional from the date of its passage, the court found the entire act to be
void for the reason that it was induced by the nonsigner provision. Its
decision was affirmed during the same term in General Electric Co. v.
71
J. L. Brandeis & Sons.
Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court, without a detailed investigation of any present need or lack of need for retail price-fixing laws,
struck down the entire act on purely constitutional grounds. It appears to be significant that each state court which has addressed itself
to the validity of Fair Trade has increasingly come to face the economic
realities and consequences of price maintenance systems and to determine
their constitutionality on the basis of economic fact. The result, once
the courts have detached the vague emotional appeal of Fair Trade from
its real purposes and effects, is apparent in the later holdings of unconstitutionality.
A surprising but heartening decision to Fair Trade opponents was
handed down in April, 1956, by the Supreme Court of Oregon. Since
1947, it had been assumed that Oregon was clearly with the majority of
state courts upholding the validity of Fair Trade.72 Nevertheless, in the
very recent case of General Electric Co. v. Wahle7 the Oregon court was
faced with the square issue of the constitutionality of the nonsigner provision in the Oregon act, and held it repugnant to the state's constitutional guarantees. Two preceding decisions were distinguished as involving different fact situations. The court's decision was based almost
entirely upon the relevant provisions of the Oregon constitution. At the
outset the substance of the act was recognized to be price-fixing. "Protection of the 'good will' of the trade-mark owner is simply an excuse
and not a reason for the law."' 4 Whatever past justification, if any
there had been for permitting retail price fixing had disappeared with
the depression of the thirties. The court developed the grounds for holding the statute unconstitutional in stating: "The right to pursue any
legitimate trade, occupation or business is a natural, essential, and inalienable right, and is protected by our constitution. Constitution of.
71. 159 Neb. 736, 68 N.W.2d 620 (1955).
72. In the case of Borden v. Schreder, 182 Ore. 34, 185 P.2d 581 (1947), the court
said: "Ever since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp . . . sustaining the constitutionality of
the Fair Trade Act of Illinois . . . the validity of such legislation has not been considered open to question." This assumption in favor of constitutionality was further
bolstered in Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Helstrom, 202 Ore. 557, 276 P.2d 720 (1954),
reaffirming Borden v. Schreder to the effect that it "held the Fair Trade Law of this
state to be constitutional."
73. 296 P.2d 635 (Ore. 1956).
74. Id. at 643.
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Oregon, Art. 1, § 20. . . . The right of an owner of property to fix
the price at which he will sell it is an inherent attribute of the property
'
itself and is within the protection of the state and federal constitutions."75
Also: ". . . The Fair Trade Act as it applies to nonsigners constitutes
an unnecessary and unreasonable interference with an individual's constitutional right of contract and of property in violation of Art. 1, § 20,
of the Oregon Constitution, and of the due process clause of the federal
' 76
constitution.
The second ground was stated: "...
We are of the opinion that
the Act also contains an attempted unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of Art. 1, § 21, Oregon Constitution. ... "77
The decision also quoted extensively from the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in the first Schwegmann decision.
Whatever the basis for its initial impression of the nonsigner provision, it is clear that the Oregon court has settled the matter to the detriment of Fair Trade, and has done so solely on state constitutional grounds
including the right to pursue any legitimate business, the right to own
property and all the rights concurrent therewith, including the right to
sell, and the right to freely contract for the sale of property. The court
did make the finding that there was no hidden legitimate public policy
behind the act, but it could hardly be said to have seriously weighed the
historical economic arguments in reaching its decision.
In April, 1956, Virginia became the eighth state thus far to invalidate its Fair Trade Act"9 by supreme court decision."
Like Minnesota,
its decision cannot be considered decisive of the matter, for it was based
upon a holding that the Fair Trade Act had been repealed by implication
by the 1950 reenactment of the Virginia Anti-monopoly Laws.8 ' In
reaching its decision on the latter ground, the court found it unnecessary
to consider "the very serious questions raised as to the constitutionality
of the Fair Trade Act when measured by the provisions of the Virginia
Constitution and the doctrine of Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853,
45 S.E. 327, . . . (1903)."2 The Young case declared unconstitutional
an Act outlawing trading stamps, used in much the same fashion as those
popular in modern times.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.

81.
82.

Ibid.
Id. at 647.
Ibid.
Id. at 651.

VA. CODE ANN. § 59-1 (1950).
92 S.E.2d 384 (Va. April, 1956).
VA. CODE ANN. § 59-20 (1950).
92 S.E.2d at 388.
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It is apparent, of course, that the decision could be negated by legislative action alone. The decision in the Young case, typical of the decisions on the subject of redeemable trading stamps and the legality thereof, is no more than speculatively indicative of what the Virginia Supreme
Court might hold when faced squarely with the issue of constitutionality
of Fair Trade. One thing appears certain; the court will seriously consider the legislative right under the police power to enact price-fixing
legislation if the Young case is any criterion. The balance does appear
to be in favor of the opponents of Fair Trade.
The Louisiana Fair Trade Act,"3 specifically its nonsigner provision, was rendered unconstitutional in recent months as constituting an
unlawful delegation of legislative power to private persons in violation
of article three, section one of the Louisiana constitution. In Dr. G. H.
Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 4 the
Louisiana Supreme Court said in effect that the right of an individual
to engage in a lawful business and to fix the price at which he disposes
of his own property is guaranteed by the due process clause of the state's
constitution. Despite apparent federal court sanction of the McGuire
Act, this does not foreclose a state determination on state constitutional
grounds because the United States Supreme Court "is powerless to resolve conflicts between state laws and state constitutions."
After Pepsodent Co. v. Krause Co.,8" decided in 1942 and followed
in several lower court decisions, Fair Trade was believed solidly entrenched in Louisiana. The court had said plainly: "The Louisiana
Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the Louisiana Fair Trade
Law, and its decision is conclusive, insofar as the State Constitution is
concerned." In the present case, however, the court distinguished its
prior decision on the ground that in the Pepsodent case the only issue before it had been the contention that the Fair Trade Act violated article
19, section 14 of the state constitution, which prohibited combinations in
restraint of trade. The nonsigner provision of the Louisiana Fair
Trade Act was then held to be beyond the legislature's police powers
and therefore void under the state's due process guarantee.88
83. LA. Rav. STAT. § 51:391 (1950).
84. 4 CCH TRADEEG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 168,400 (La. Sup. Ct. June, 1956).
85. 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942).
86. An interesting sidelight to the main holding developed when plaintiff contended
that, were it not for the federal antitrust laws, he would have the right to impose some
sort of lien or servitude upon his commodities which could bear upon third parties not
in privity of contract (and therefore since the antitrust laws grant exception to Fair
Trade legislation, the latter is presumably a statement of the seller's rights). The court
answered simply that "such a lien or servitude or covenant running-with-the-article is
not known to our law," which results in there being some question, although not mentioned,
as to the validity of written price maintenance agreements in Louisiana.
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Thus the Louisiana court, exercising its prerogative to alter its
views in the matter of the constitutionality of state laws, took the common ground developed in the recent cases and decided the case on the
ground that the state constitution's due process clause was violated by
an unauthorized exercise of the police power. Again, economic issues
were mentioned only in passing. Shorn of its emotional aspects, the
question of the invalidity of the nonsigner provision was relatively a
simple matter.
The most recent decision rendering the nonsigner provision of a
Fair Trade act unconstitutional and inoperative is a decision by the Colorado Supreme Court.8 7 The holding was based simply upon the delegation-of-power principle: "The General Assembly itself has no power to
fix the prices of merchandise sold on the open market. It follows that
it cannot lawfully delegate such authority to another."
In two states, the lower courts have denied constitutionality to their
respective Fair Trade acts as they apply to non-contracting persons.
The first was in Utah, where a district court in 1954 held the entire act
void and in direct contravention of the Utah constitution. 8 The second
was Indiana, where a superior court in 1955 declared the Indiana Fair
Trade Act unconstitutional on similar grounds.8 9 It should be noted,
however, that in 1954 a federal district court in Indiana held the same
act valid and the nonsigner provision enforceable."0
In South Carolina, a motion to temporarily restrain alleged violations of the state's Fair Trade laws was dismissed in federal district
court." Although the South Carolina Supreme Court had never passed
upon the validity of Fair Trade or its nonsigner provision, District Judge
Timmerman felt bound to follow, for the time at least, a county court
decision which held the entire act void and in direct contravention of the
92
state's constitution.
A recent circuit court decision in Kentucky held the Kentucky Fair
Trade Act in general, and its nonsigner provision specifically, unconstitutional as violative of section 13 of the Kentucky constitution, which
87. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956
Trade Cas.) f[ 68,463 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1956).
88. General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade
Cas.) f[ 67,861 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1954).
89. Bargain Barn, Inc. v. Arvin Industries, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954
Trade Cas.) U68,074 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1955).
90. Sherwin Williams Co. v. Bargain Barn, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954
67,697 (D.C. Ind. 1954).
Trade Cas.) Uf
91. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Rogers-Kent, Inc., 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1956 Trade Cas.) ff 68,389 (D.C. S. C. 1956).
92. Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1955 Trade Cas.) f[ 68,084 (S.C. Co. Ct. 1955).
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forbids an unlawful taking of property.9 3 Admittedly the points for
unconstitutionality were not so well taken as in prior decisions. Nevertheless, the issue of the validity of Fair Trade will probably soon be before another state supreme court, and with the additional advantage of
a federal district court opinion in support of the lower court's decision."'
III.
Although opponents of Fair Trade no longer face the uphill battle
they previously encountered, much remains to be done if the illegality of
retail price fixing is to be permanently established. The problem is twofold. States which have given apparent legal sanction to Fair Trade
must and can be convinced otherwise. States which have enacted Fair
Trade legislation which has not yet been tested in the courts must, when
the situation arises, be convinced of the invalidity of their laws. The
contemporary precedents above analyzed are of value not only for purposes of establishing grounds for invalidation but also, through their
very number, heightening the force of the legal argument.
In states where Fair Trade has received supreme court sanction,
only the initial approach to the problem of constitutionality differs from
the state where the issue is one of the first impression. In the former
situation, courts seem more than willing to distinguish prior decisions
on the ground that the arguments for a decision of unconstitutionality
had not theretofore been presented to the court. A hesitant court might
be reminded that in matters of such social and economic importance,
courts have freely exercised the prerogative to alter their views as to the
constitutionality of state laws. A point of importance to consider is the
present condition of the American economy, and the argument that whatever the need for protective price-setting may have been, it can no
longer be justified. Once a court is determined to reconsider its prior decision on any one or more of these grounds, the issues are the same as in
a case of first impression.
93. General Electric Co. v. American Buyers Cooperative, Inc., 4 CCH TRADE
REG. RE'. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68,341 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1956). The basis for the court's
reasoning was that the act bound persons who were not aware of any restriction when
they purchased the commodity but who later acquired knowledge of such restriction
before sale thereof to another. A somewhat better-reasoned ground for unconstitutionality was the proposition that § 198 of the Kentucky Constitution, requiring the
General Assembly to "enact such laws as may be necessary to prevent trusts, pools, and
combinations from combining to depreciate any article below its real value," even
though it was not violated in this instance by plaintiff, was nevertheless "an expression
of the public policy of Kentucky against price fixing." This public policy was contravened
by the Fair Trade Act, which permitted price fixing.
94. Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
68,407 (D.C. Ky. 1956).
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The common ground for a finding of unconstitutionality rests within the due process clauses of the respective state constitutions. It is
most effectively argued that the acts violate the right of a person to lawfully acquire and thereafter sell property which belongs to him, at the
price which he determines. Even if a written price-fixing contract constitutes no violation of a state's common law regarding restrictive covenants, or anti-monopoly laws pertaining to agreements in restraint of
competition, this objection, directed against the nonsigner provision, appears to be the most persuasive. The basic premise is, of course, the
abuse of legislative police powers. This is consistently proved by a
showing that the legislation is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory
in that it allows only a relatively few producers of trademarked commodities the right to fix prices. The often quoted metaphor is, that by
adopting Fair Trade, states have thrown the baby (free competition) out
with the bathwater (loss-leader selling and other minor "evils" sought
to be cured by permitting price-fixing). In present times, at least, it is
plausibly argued that such legislation cannot meet the test of a valid
exercise of the police power, namely, that the act bears no reasonable and
provable relationship to the public morals, health, safety, or general
welfare.
Perhaps next in order of persuasiveness as to invalidity is case
authority against permissive price-fixing statutes affecting other areas
of business or agriculture. Whether the latter decisions were predicated
upon the lack of legislative power to fix prices, or the power to delegate
that right, is immaterial, for if the legislature had not the power to fix
such prices, then clearly it could not delegate that power to a private party.
An excellent policy argument, which some decisions fail to mention,
is a two-point attack on Fair Trade at its very source. The stated purpose of the acts is to protect trade-marks or brand names and the good
will established by the use thereof. Yet the federal trade-mark legislation as well as the doctrine of unfair competition provides extensive protection for those items of good will. Such protection should be sufficient. But the true purpose of Fair Trade acts is really not to render such
protection at all. Among the most vigilant supporters of price-fixing
are the retail druggists associations.
Effective attacks on Fair Trade statutes can also be made on technical grounds. Significantly, no court which has initially so acted has
failed to find its act unconstitutional when later faced with the defective
statute corrected. Notable also is the fact that once rendered ineffective,
Fair Trade statutes have not regained their former force and prestige
by corrective reenactment.
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It is thus within the framework of the individual state court systems
that Fair Trade is firially meeting defeat. 5 With its tenuous justification
for existence hanging by the thread of denial of Federal certiorari, the
current of authority appears to be fast moving in favor of the opponents
of Fair Trade.
95. It is to be remembered that such major business states as New York, Illinois,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey still remain citadels of fair trade.
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